We analyze three games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves players’ trusting that others will not make mistakes. It has three Nash equilibria but only one is consistent with backward induction. We show the other two Nash equilibria are not subgame perfect: each fails to induce Nash in a subgame. The seco ... Show More
Jun 2018
Lecture 22
- Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
In business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentives for good behavior today, but, to work, these promises and threats must be credible. In particular, they must come from equilibrium behavior tomorrow, and henc ... Show More
1h 15m
Apr 2024
Episode 274: Sofia De Jesus
Send us a textExploring the Complex Landscape of AI in Education with Sofia De Jesus In this episode of the My EdTech Life Podcast, I sit down with Sofia De Jesus, an associate program manager at CMUCS Academy, CSTA Equity Fellow, and author, to discuss the intricacies of AI in e ... Show More
1h 6m
Dec 2023
“Great Buys” in Education: Maximizing learning in low and middle-income countries
In this episode, we are featuring Benjamin Piper, the Director of Global Education at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Ben sheds light on the groundbreaking work of the Global Education Evidence Advisory Panel (GEEAP). With an exhaustive analysis of over 13,000 academic studi ... Show More
28m 28s