We look at two settings with asymmetric information; one side of a game knows something that the other side does not. We should always interpret attempts to communicate or signal such information taking into account the incentives of the person doing the signaling. In the first setting, information is verifiable. Here, the failure explicitly to reveal inform ... Show More
Jun 2018
Lecture 22
- Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
In business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentives for good behavior today, but, to work, these promises and threats must be credible. In particular, they must come from equilibrium behavior tomorrow, and henc ... Show More
1h 15m
Jun 2018
Lecture 21
- Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game
We discuss repeated games, aiming to unpack the intuition that the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment in the future of a relationship can provide incentives for good behavior today. In class, we play prisoners’ dilemma twice and three times, but this fails to sustain ... Show More
1h 15m
Nov 2023
Stopping the spread of misinformation, with Sander van der Linden, PhD
Misleading news stories. Propaganda. Conspiracy theories. Misinformation has always been with us, but with the rise of social media it can spread farther and faster than ever. Sander van der Linden, PhD, of Cambridge University, talks about why we’re so vulnerable to misinformati ... Show More
40m 35s