Can a central bank simply announce an inflation target and get everyone to believe it? Our Global Economist Arunima Sinha looks at the cases of South Africa and Brazil to explain why it’s a subject of decades-long debate.
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Arunima Sinha: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Arunima Sinha, Global Economist at Morgan Stanley.
Today I'm going to talk about how inflation targets of central banks matter for market participants and economic activity.
It's Tuesday, August 12th at 10am in New York.
Tariff driven inflation is at the center of financial market debates right now. The received wisdom is that a central bank should look through one-off increases in prices if – and it is an important if – inflation expectations are anchored low enough. Inflation targets, inflation expectations, and central bank credibility have been debated for decades.
The Fed's much criticized view that COVID inflation would be transitory was based on the assumption that anchored inflation expectations would pull inflation down. The Fed is more cautious now after four years of above target inflation. Can a central bank simply announce an inflation target and get everyone to believe it?
Far away from the U.S., the South Africa Reserve Bank, SARB, is providing a real time experiment. The SARB’s inflation target was originally a range of 3 to 6 per cent, with an intention to shift to 2 to 4 percent over time. At its last meeting, the SARB announced that it was going to target the bottom end of the range, de facto shifting to a 3 percent target. A decision by the Ministry of Finance in the coming months is likely necessary to formalise the outcome, but the SARB has succeeded in pulling inflation down. It has established credibility, but we suspect that more work is needed to anchor inflation expectations firmly at 3 percent.
Key to the SARS challenge, as the Fed’s – the central bank cannot control all the drivers of inflation in the short run. For South Africa, fiscal targets and exchange rate movements are prime examples. The experience in Brazil offers insight for South Africa. The BCB adopted an inflation target in 1999 following the end of the currency peg that helps the transition away from hyperinflation. The target was initially set at 8 percent, lowered to 4.5 percent in 2005, and then lowered again to 3 percent in 2024.Fiscal outcomes, market expectations, and currency volatility have been hard to contain. The lessons apply to South Africa and also the Fed. Successful inflation targeting relies on a clear framework, but also on institutional strength and political consensus.
For South Africa, as inflation falls ex-ante real interest rates will rise. That outcome will be necessary to restrain the economy enough to make sure that the path to 3 percent is achieved. For an open EM economy, there likely needs to be consistency by both monetary and fiscal authorities with regard to short-term pressures, both internal and external.
While we ultimately expect the SARB to be able to anchor inflation expectations, the journey may not be a quick one; and that journey will likely depend on keeping real interest rates on the higher side to ensure the convergence.
We take the experiences of South Africa and Brazil to be informative globally. Simply announcing an inflation target likely does not solve the problem. The Fed, for example, spent much of the 2010s hoping to get inflation up to target – while now ironically, inflation in the US has run above target for almost half a decade.
Whether the lingering effects of the COVID inflation has affected the price setting mechanism is unclear, as is whether tariff driven inflation will exacerbate the situation. Our read of the evidence is that inflation expectations and central bank credibility come from hitting the target, not from announcing it.
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