sient execution side channel attack which targets the Chrome web browser. We show that despite Google's attempts to mitigate Spectre by deploying Strict Site Isolation, information extraction via malicious JavaScript code is still possible in some cases.

Resources

https://www.spookjs.com/

https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/site-isolation

Paper: https://www.spookjs.com/files/spook-js.pdf

Chapters

0:00 Process Isolation in Chrome

8:00 Spook.js subdomain Attack

12:00 Spook.js Extension Attack

13:00 Summary

Become a Member on YouTube

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_ML5xP23TOWKUcc-oAE_Eg/join

🔥 Members Only Content

https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=UUMO_ML5xP23TOWKUcc-oAE_Eg

Support my work on PayPal

https://bit.ly/33ENps4

🧑‍🏫 Courses I Teach

https://husseinnasser.com/courses

--- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/hnasr/support1d:T47f,Fundamentals of Operating Systems Course https://oscourse.winktls is brilliant.TLS encryption/decryption often happens in userland. While TCP lives in the kernel. With ktls, userland can hand the keys to the kernel and the kernel does crypto. When calling write, the kernel encrypts the packet and send it to the NIC.When calling read, the kernel decrypts the packet and handed it to the userspace. This mode still taxes the host’s CPU of course, so there is another mode where the kernel offloads the crypto to the NIC device! Host CPU becomes free. Incoming packets to the NIC are decrypted in device before they are DMAed to the kernel. outgoing packets are encrypted before they leave the NIC to the network.ktls still need handshake to happen in userspace. There is also enabling zerocopy in some cases (now that kernel has context) Deserves a video. So much good stuff.0:00 Intro2:00 Userspace SSL Libraries 3:00 ktls 6:00 Kernel Encrypts/Decrypts (TLS_SW)

Spook.js - This will bloat Chrome even m...